The ‘Youth Bulge’ and Political Unrest in Iraq: A Political Economy Approach by Amirali, Asha
   
The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons 
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an 
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.  
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other 
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please 
contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
Helpdesk Report  
The ‘Youth Bulge’ and Political 
Unrest in Iraq: A Political Economy 
Approach 
Asha Amirali  
Institute of Development Studies  
11th November 2019 
Question 
What is the relationship between the ‘youth bulge’ and political 
unrest in Iraq?  
Contents 
1. Summary  
2. Understanding the focus on youth and the ‘youth bulge’  
3. Youth in Iraq: a snapshot 
4. Youth unemployment and political violence  
5. Education and political violence  






This report reviews existing research on the relationship between the ‘youth bulge’ and political 
unrest in order to understand when and why young Iraqis resort to violence or disruption. There 
is some disagreement in the literature about whether youth bulges can be said to cause political 
violence and disruption or not. Some studies posit a simple causal relationship. Others argue – 
more convincingly – that neither demographic nor economic factors alone are enough to incite 
violence. The latter perspective maintains that the effects of protracted conflict and the specific 
nature of the country’s political economy significantly shape young people’s strategies for 
subsistence and social status.  
In Iraq, widespread youth unemployment combines with high levels of political exclusion, 
sectarian politics, militarization, perceptions of injustice, frustrated aspirations, war-related 
trauma, and the rapid breakdown and transformation of traditional institutions such as family and 
tribe. Together, these factors (and others not covered in this review) produce violence in specific 
moments. A systematic study of how Iraq’s youth ‘bulge’ affects the country’s political dynamics 
is warranted. 
There is little academic work on youth behaviour in Iraq but development organizations have 
conducted relevant small-scale studies in recent years. While these studies are locality and time-
specific, they are an important source of information for this report. The academic literature is 
mined for cross-national analysis as well as comparative cases. The cross-national analyses are 
quantitative and their findings should be treated with the caution appropriate to all studies that do 
not account closely for contextual variation and those things which cannot be put in numbers.  
2. Understanding the focus on youth and the ‘youth bulge’  
What is the ‘youth bulge’?  
The ‘youth bulge’ refers to the numerical dominance of young men aged 15-291 relative to other 
age groups in a society. The term gained prominence in the 1990’s as individuals working within 
the US security establishment sought to explain political instability in the Arab world and 
recruitment to international terrorist networks (Urdal 2006: 608). These origins continue to be 
reflected in how the term is used today as much of the literature on the youth bulge appears 
driven by an interest in security, the maintenance of political order, and economic growth.  
Sukarieh and Tannock (2019: 856) maintain that within academic and policy circles the concept 
is used as a ‘politically acceptable euphemism for talking about the problem of expanding surplus 
populations in the post-welfare era’. In other words, the concern seems to be less with full 
and equal inclusion and more about what to do about a large, restive population that is 
‘structurally irrelevant to capital accumulation’ and threatens the prevailing national and/or global 
political order. Similar concerns are expressed elsewhere (eg: PAI 2007), namely that it is often 
easier to think that youth ‘cause’ unrest and violence rather than accept that deep political and 
economic problems are eliciting desperate responses.  
                                                   
1 Age boundaries for the category of ‘youth’ are not consistent across the literature. Some include 15-24 year 
olds, other 15-29 year olds. And while the word youth is theory includes females, the literature on the youth bulge 
almost exclusively considers young men. 
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The limitations of ‘youth’ 
It is important also to observe that there are limitations to the term ‘youth’2, especially in a context 
such as Iraq. Given that an estimated 60 percent of the country’s population is under 25 years of 
age, it is not clear how policies and programmes could specifically target a separate ‘youth’ 
population. ‘Youth’ may be too broad a category to inflect much meaning for policy 
purposes and may misinform policy development by collapsing crucial identity markers and 
relative positionalities into sameness. For example, gender, religion, tribal affiliation, class 
position, and other identities strongly impact young Iraqis’ social, political, and economic options 
– not explicitly building these into youth policy development will seriously undermine the efficacy 
of development interventions.  
Most of the quantitative academic literature reviewed did not seem sufficiently alive to these 
differences; by contrast, recent field-based research by development organizations and 
qualitative academic studies are more so. 
3. Youth in Iraq: a snapshot 
Iraq has one of the youngest populations in the world, with seven million people aged 14-29.  
Nearly 60 percent are below 25 years of age, and the youth population is projected to increase 
from seven to ten million between 2015 and 20303. Two broad factors strongly shape young 
Iraqis’ lives today:  i) the multi-dimensional impact of war and ii) the nature of Iraq’s oil economy. 
War  
The country has been in a state of war since 1980. The current generation of young people has 
grown up in a society still reeling from the effects of some of the toughest international sanctions 
ever imposed (1991-2003) and an extensive war on Iraqi soil that began in 2003 with the US-led 
invasion. The effects of protracted war on young people have been severe. 
The literature reviewed for this report unanimously agrees that the basic needs of large 
numbers of young people are going unmet. The fighting has destroyed at least 8,850 
educational facilities across Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in recent years; in 2018, 50% of Iraqi 
children were out of school (WB 2018: 2). As expected, literacy levels are low: 33 percent of 
youth between the ages of 15 and 29 are illiterate or only semi-literate, 33 percent have 
completed primary school, 28 percent have finished middle or high school, and only seven 
percent have completed post-secondary education. 
Protracted war has also led to the proliferation of militarized sectarianism. The recent battle 
between Islamic State (IS) on the one hand, and the Iraqi state and US forces on the other has 
involved armed young men on a large scale. The state itself has actively recruited unemployed 
young boys and men from internally displaced persons (IDP) camps to join Iraqi government-
                                                   
2 A point argued widely in the sociology of childhood and youth literature. See James and Prout (1997). 
3 Population growth is expected to begin slowing down in the coming decades but remain positive: by 2050, 14 of 
the 20 countries in the MENA region are expected to have fertility rates below replacement levels of 2.1. 
However, the projected fertility rates for Iraq and Sudan are the highest at 3.0 children per woman (UNICEF 
2019:19). 
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backed militias. ‘We are fighting alongside the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces], and our salaries are 
paid by Baghdad [US 375 a month], we are basically part of the Iraqi military’ said a 20 year-old 
recruit in an IDP camp near Mosul (Human Rights Watch 2016). Some observers think the 
extensive experience with sectarianism, both militant and less overtly violent, will shape the 
future in its own image:  
‘The millennial generation has an amorphous identity: depending on the context 
and who seeks to mobilise them, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, locally geographic or other 
sub-national identity will emerge as the avenue through which members see and 
challenge the establishment. Iraqi youth were the most vulnerable to deepening sectarian 
polarisation after the Syrian uprising, and this pitted young against young along 
sectarian lines even as they all shared an anti-establishment animus’ (ICG 2016:12). 
 
Others are more hopeful about the future, including the prominent Iraqi sociologist Faleh Jabar 
(2018), who thinks that Iraqi youth are ready to embrace a more inclusive, national politics. It is 
certainly the case that the post-Saddam generation has not been exposed to programmatic 
politics or inclusive 20th century ideologies such as pan-Arabism; however Jabar believes that 
youth – young men and women both – are beginning to reject identity-based politics in favour of 
issue-based mobilization. Through a survey of participants in the street protests of 2015, most of 
whom were under the age of 30, he concludes that this generation seeks reform rather than 
regime change. Not swapping one faction or sect for another, but rather an end to corruption, 
more jobs, and a better distribution of Iraq’s wealth.  
 
The 2015 protests Jabar and his colleagues studied can be seen as precursors to the protests 
that have since continued to rock Iraqi cities. In October 2019, young Baghdadis on the streets 
were also emphasizing that their fight was not sectarian, chanting ‘Secular, secular, not Sunni, 
not Shia’ (Al-Fanar 2019) although the protests have become more charged and Jabar’s reading 
of what protestors want is contested: ‘what we see today is an explosion of raw anger rather than 
a focused protest with specific demands. Overhaul rather than reform is what those on the 
streets are pushing for’ (Haddad 2019).  
However, Haddad (2017) too sees stirrings of a new Iraqi nationalism and thinks that it is a 
consequence of legitimacy gained by the extremely difficult and ultimately successful war against 
IS. The efforts of the non-state armed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) volunteers in particular 
are thought to have been much appreciated by people. Such unifying sentiments have not been 
present in Iraq since the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 and he thinks this is an opportunity for positive 
change: ‘The resurgent Iraqi nationalism felt across Arab Iraq, the goodwill generated by the fight 
against IS, the cooperation it engendered and the related decline in sect-centric politics provide 
Iraq with a window of opportunity. It is an undoubtedly time-limited window but with enough 
political will, it may help Iraq move beyond the politics of perpetual crisis that have pervaded Iraq 
since 2003 ‘(ibid: 3). 
Finally, the effects of living through war on young people’s psychosocial development are 
immense and flagged by organizations working closely with them as determining for Iraq’s future 
(Oxfam 2017; Save the Children 2017, 2018). A significant number of young people now have 
direct experience of the 2003 US-led offensive, the sectarian fighting plaguing the country, IS 
occupation, and the fight against IS. They carry significant trauma as a result. Save the Children 
reports that ‘children experience intense sorrow and extreme sadness with nearly 43 per cent of 
children reporting feeling grief always or a lot of the time. Caregivers reported their children as 
having very high emotional and behavioural difficulties…[and] also reflected that 66 per cent of 
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their children displayed grief most of the time’ (Save the Children 2018:8). Oxfam (2017) too 
reports serious mental health issues amongst the youth population of Mosul and it can be 
expected that young people in other areas similarly affected by fighting would be the same.  
Oil  
The post-Saddam period has coincided with an exceptional oil ‘windfall’ that has significantly 
shaped young people’s expectations as well as their possibilities for realizing themselves 
as adults, providers, and respected members of society.  
‘Iraq’s young people do not remember life under Saddam Hussein, only the period under elected 
Iraqi governments flush with oil wealth’ (Patel 2018:2). Oil prices have remained significantly 
higher than pre-2003 levels for most of this period, touching $100 per barrel in September 2007 
and hovering around this point until dropping in mid-2014 to $50 (ibid: 4). Approximately 90-94% 
of Iraqi state revenues come from the sale of oil and the country strongly manifests symptoms of 
the ‘resource curse’ such as high levels of corruption, the use of state revenues to ‘buy’ 
governmental legitimacy, and an overwhelming reliance on the public sector for employment. 
It is widely acknowledged that the post-2003 regime was not – and is not – based on a national 
consensus. Lacking popular legitimacy, those in control of the state have distributed oil wealth 
through dense patronage networks to shore up support. One of the most valued ‘handouts’ has 
been employment and the numbers are dramatic: public sector employment in Iraq tripled from 
2003 to 2015, going from about 1 million to just over 3 million (or approximately 22% of all jobs in 
2003 to 42% of all jobs in 2015). The percentage of total government expenditures devoted to 
wages rose from 7% in 2004 to almost 40% by 2015. In 2013, the Iraqi government employed 6 
million people, or 71% of the labor force (ibid). The cessation of hiring since 2016 means that 
these numbers are not likely to be much different today; yet, such a rapid and sustained rise in 
public sector employment and the scarcity of jobs in the private sector has meant that young 
people expect employment from the state. The hiring freeze, imposed as part of a deal with the 
IMF as Iraq tries to rebuild after the wars, is understandably not a popular measure with young 
people. 
Oil has also allowed Iraqi elites to maintain a high degree of autonomy from society. This 
is problematic to the extent that it renders the state unaccountable and unresponsive to social 
groups and classes. ‘Fiscal contract’ theorists argue that there are beneficial political effects of 
‘co-producing’ national wealth with social groups as well as taxing them (eg: Moore 2015, Ross 
2013). This is because the arduous process of tax collection increases state capacity and 
because taxation can lead to taxed groups and classes politically engaging the state, making it 
‘listen’ as well as be more accountable. The literature reviewed on Iraq is in agreement – 
implicitly or explicitly - that oil has allowed elite factions significant autonomy from their social 
bases and that this has had deleterious effects on politics, political institutions, and the economy.  
4. Youth unemployment and political violence  
At 36 percent, Iraq’s youth unemployment is very high and ‘could reach crisis proportions’ if not 
urgently addressed (WB 2018:1). By 2030, the number of Iraqis (not just youth) in need of new 
jobs is projected to range between five and seven million, which represents an increase of 100 to 
180 percent over the next 11 years.    
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This rapid review has not found any studies examining the link between youth unemployment in 
Iraq and political unrest/violence. However, there are some fairly obvious reasons for thinking 
there may be some direct causation: unemployment is one of the most frequently cited reasons 
for young people’s involvement in the protests of recent years4 and young men joining militias 
have often done so to provide for their families, feel ‘empowered’, and gain respect from the 
community.  
Save the Children’s interviews with young people who lived under IS occupation in Mosul reveal 
that ‘while the youth within this study now universally reject ISIS, they have not rejected all non-
state armed actors. Many feel that having an affiliation with other militia groups is either 
necessary or beneficial - a way to provide for their families, protect their communities, and gain 
status within society. This is highly problematic not only from a child and youth protection 
standpoint, but from an overall societal one as well’ (2017:25). The International Crisis Group 
writes that ‘the [militias] also gave youths unprecedented symbolic and material power to play a 
dominant role in their direct environment and a social ladder that bypassed the patriarchal family, 
tribal groups and patronage networks of Iraqi society’ (2016:17) 
It is therefore reasonable to assume, and has also been demonstrated by literature from 
elsewhere5, that the choice to join an armed group is made in lieu of other strategies for 
subsistence, control, and social respect that are less easily available – if at all – to young 
men in particular moments.  
Studies from other countries show a clear association between large populations of young men, 
unemployment and violence (both armed insurrection and more common instances of rioting). 
The quantitative literature offers much more simplistic causal analysis in comparison to 
qualitative work but there is some agreement that the propensity to violence is higher under 
conditions of an authoritarian regime, political exclusion, and high levels of actual and relative 
material deprivation.  
Henrik Urdal is one of the most cited political demographers working on the issue. In a well-
known paper (2004) he notes that while youth bulges6 are strongly associated with increased 
levels of domestic armed conflict, the reasons for this are not easily generalizable, cannot be 
assumed, and must be empirically investigated. However, the combination of youth bulges 
and widespread unemployment clearly increases the likelihood of violence, particularly 
when young people cannot easily migrate away from their societies in search of a better life as 
they did in 19th century Europe. Migration was a ‘safety valve’ but one that is no longer available 
to young people from developing societies.   
Similarly, using cross-country panel data from 169 countries, Apolte and Gerlin (2015) have 
investigated the link between armed insurrection and large youth cohorts. They find that it is not 
the demographic structure or the relative size of the youth cohort as such but rather the reality of 
large youth populations facing significant unemployment that coincides with insurrection. 
                                                   
4 See for example reporting of the 2015-2019 protests by Al-Jazeera, the Guardian, and Al-Fanar. 
5 See for example Enria (2018) on unemployment and youth violence in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Rezyk 
(2016) on Egypt.  
6 Defined as youth cohorts of 15–24 year-olds relative to the total adult population (15 years and above) 
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Box 1: The ‘unlimited supply of labour’ 
The problem of ensuring employability is particularly pronounced for countries with large, 
young, but poorly-educated populations today. Surprisingly, this has not received much 
attention in recent years despite Arthur Lewis (1954) famously identifying the problem of the 
‘unlimited supply of labour’ in developing countries. He argued that as long as excess labour 
existed, wages would remain low and poverty would persist. Driven as it was by profit-
seeking, the private sector could not be expected to invest at the scale necessary to increase 
labour productivity and create new jobs in manufacturing. Government would have to support 
industrialisation programmes and create jobs to absorb large numbers of workers. In the 
model, this would eventually push wages up, eliminate poverty, and create a new and 
improved developmental equilibrium.  
 
While statistical analysis may be useful in establishing broad trends, a great deal of criticism has 
been levelled against how these studies have causally linked violence with unemployment (see 
Oosterom 2018 for a comprehensive review of this literature). Violent conflict cannot be reduced 
to the single factor of un/underemployment or access to economic opportunities these scholars 
argue. Instead, high unemployment only tips over into unrest and violence when combined 
with other social and political factors. For example, Rezyk (2016) studies the political-
economic factors that contributed to the uprisings in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. She argues that it 
was not the extremely high and increasing rates of unemployment amongst Egyptian youth or 
increasing poverty on its own but rather people’s perceptions of the political handling of the 
situation that drove them to revolt. Similarly, drawing on empirical data about young people in 
Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, in the wake of its civil war, Enria (2018) argues that violence is 
not inherent to unemployment and ‘the impact of joblessness on political activism is mediated by 
social factors and the specific nature of the post-war political economy. For Freetown's youth, 
labour market exclusion is seen to have implications for social status, identities and social 
relations…[t]his in turn shapes their political subjectivities and claims on the state, and structures 
the opportunities and constraints to their collective action’. 
 
The recent wave of protests and rioting in Iraqi cities is still too fresh to provide answers to big 
questions. What do young people want? Is it jobs and improved social welfare or is it a new more 
inclusive political order? To what extent is violence a preferred strategy for articulating and 
achieving their goals? What other strategies are available to them? Most analyses of the recent 
protests concur that the turn from protest to rioting has been a direct consequence of the ‘heavy-
handedness’ of the state (Haddad 2019, Abdul-Ahad 2019) but there is not yet enough 
systematic evidence on how youth anger and aspirations are taking shape. 
5. Education and political violence 
Both access to education and the quality of education in Iraq are very poor. Relative to other 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, Iraqi students spend less time in the classroom 
(WB 2017: 79) and the World Bank estimates that half of the youth population is not in school 
(WB 2018: 2). In such a situation, education clearly needs to be a government and donor priority. 
However, in the wake of an increasing concern with terrorism and global security, some scholars 
have problematized the link between youth violence and education. 
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A large body of quantitative academic work explores the relationship between higher 
education and political violence. The conclusions are mixed. Some find increased levels of 
violence and political instability accompanying rapid expansions in higher (and in some cases, 
even secondary) education in youthful societies. Others find no connection between educational 
expansion and political violence. Both ‘camps’ are aware of the methodological problems 
bedevilling longitudinal, cross-national analysis and agree that these problems significantly affect 
the quality of the explanations generated. For example, Ostby et. al. (2019) note that their 
conclusions do not explain the important question of why and how education influences 
peace and conflict, and the implications for policy are therefore limited7.  
Their systematic review of 42 quantitative studies (the majority of which were conducted after 
2005) on education and political violence finds that ‘education has an overall pacifying effect 
on conflict’ and that ‘rapid expansion in tertiary education does not generally seem to be 
causing destabilization and violence’ (Ostby et.al. 2019: 80). The authors note that this general 
conclusion is challenged by the fact that terrorists and genocide perpetrators have above-
average levels of education; however they argue that ‘there is little empirical support for concerns 
that governments should be cautious about expanding access to education rapidly’.  
By contrast, Weber (2019) analyses data from 183 countries over a 20-year period (1996-2015) 
and concludes that ‘youth bulges tend to become a threat to stability when coinciding with 
expansions in post-primary education among young people’ (104). He believes that expanding 
post-primary education in countries characterized by high fertility rates and low levels of 
education such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen will increase political instability8 because 
newly-educated youth cohorts will have increased expectations that are likely to go unmet.  
Qualitative studies focus attention on the specific political economic contexts within which youth 
violence occurs and find that education might be positively linked with violence when 
combined with high youth unemployment, perceptions of injustice and political exclusion, 
and frustrated aspirations. For example, Alfy (2016) seeks to explain the spike in youth-led 
political violence in Egypt after January 2011 and finds that in Egypt, large numbers of young 
university graduates were frustrated by the lack of job opportunities and their inability to influence 
the political process and the ruling elite. This frustration assumed the form of a ‘‘generational 
clash, exemplified in a statement issued by the White Knights football fan club, which noted that 
the clashes with security were an expression of 'the battle of an entire generation that only asked 
for a normal life, only asked that it be the master of its own affairs, as they know their affairs 
best’’. Similarly, Rezyk’s study cited in the previous section also concluded that a number of 
factors contributed to ‘tipping’ youth mobilization into violence. 
                                                   
7 Specifically, ‘if poorly educated, unemployed individuals are recruited into violent conflict due to low opportunity 
costs, then policymakers would be wise to maximize attainment across the population. If, however, individuals 
mobilize for violence due to grievances over the unequal distribution of education, then policymakers must pay 
careful attention to ensuring that marginalized groups are granted improved access to education’ (Ostby et. al. 
2019: 80).   
8 The author is quick to caveat this hypothesis with the following: ‘We are not suggesting postponing or halting 
progress in these domains: On the contrary, there are many good reasons to expand education and encourage 
lower birth rates which can be crucial for peace and prosperity in the long run. However, during a transitional 
phase that usually follows the onset of fertility decline, educational expansion in the presence of large youth 
bulges can be an explosive combination’ (pp.105) 
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Finally, the idea that better-educated individuals have higher expectations and are sensitive 
to perceptions of status emerges from Campante and Chor (2011, 2012). They find that while 
better-educated individuals are more likely to engage in political acts such as demonstrations, 
boycotts, and strikes, this link between education and political protest is stronger among those 
individuals whose income-returns to their educational qualifications are lowest. Morocco, Iraq, 
Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria are among the lowest-ranked countries when compared with the rest 
of the world on this account, i.e. similarly educated individuals in these countries are earning 
significantly less than their equivalently-educated counterparts in other countries. In other words, 
they find that relative deprivation and perceptions of injustice are heightened amongst those with 
higher educational qualifications, leading to increased political violence. 
6. Policy implications 
Creating Jobs 
The state of the literature on youth unemployment in developing societies and how to address it 
is now fairly advanced. A large amount of funding has been channelled to creating jobs in recent 
years – most of it has been highly unsuccessful (see Oosterom 2018). Youth employment 
programs that do not build existing political factors and on-going conflicts into their 
design will fail, and at worst, may even exacerbate the local dynamics that sustain 
conflict. The problem as identified by this body of scholarship is that ‘all too often… the ‘peace 
dividend’ is assumed to be a ‘spill-over effect’. Theories of change do not articulate pathways 
that link the different activities to actual impact on peace and stability and pay little attention to 
other youth grievances, such as corruption inequalities in economic opportunities and 
experiences of substantive citizenship’ (ibid:12). 
The World Bank’s recent primer on job creation in Iraq, while well-intentioned, does not contain 
the attention to political detail that Oosterom and others think is necessary to produce a 
successful intervention. It does however display a degree of openness to move away from ‘best 
practice’ in light of specific contextual needs. Labelling its policy prescriptions as an 
‘unconventional approach’ to tackling the problem of youth unemployment in Iraq, the Bank notes 
that: 
 there is an urgent need to create large numbers of jobs in a very short amount of time 
 typical private sector-enhancing reforms are not likely to be successful in the current 
Iraqi context. Government must therefore be allotted a bigger role in economic 
rejuvenation than is customary for the Bank 
 the legitimacy of the Iraqi state depends on meeting people’s expectations of a ‘peace 
dividend’ – scale and speed of job creation is therefore a central criteria by which the 
Iraqi government will be judged  
The International Crisis Group (2016) also highlights the need to urgently expand public works 
and recommends that:  
 Sunni youth groups in areas retaken from IS be engaged in reconstruction 
 the volunteer combat groups set up in 2014 (hashd al-shaabi or the PMF) be converted 
into a civilian mobilisation directed to rebuilding communities within the framework of 
local administration 
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 the strategy of relying on militias and non-state military recruitment be immediately 
abandoned. It will be a challenge to add more people to the state payroll, but a fund 
needs to be built for this purpose and donor agencies must work with the state to this end   
It is beyond the scope of this review to identify what might support effective job creation in Iraq. 
However, this is an important and urgent task. See Oosterom 2018 for a recent comprehensive 
analysis of factors affecting employment policy performance in fragile and conflicted affected 
states.  
Political Inclusion  
The approach advocated by Oosteroom and others towards job creation, i.e. that it be sensitive 
to the political dynamics of the locality and include young people in design and implementation, is 
mirrored by those who have done fieldwork with Iraqi children. Reflecting on how peace can be 
re-established in regions recovering from long and protracted conflict, Save the Children stresses 
the inclusion of young people not as passive recipients of social welfare, jobs, or education 
programmes, but as active participants in the design of policies delivering these goods and 
reallocating resources: ‘indeed it is imperative that this process is also driven by community 
dialogue. Thus, any programs or processes need to be designed to enable youth to access 
information, participate in political processes and be able to express their concerns and 
desires in a safe manner’ (2017:26). 
Softening Divides 
An example of how positive social relationships and solidarity can be built up across 
religious divides is found in an innovative field experiment conducted by a Stanford researcher 
in 2017 in the predominantly Christian city of Erbil, Iraq9. The researcher organized a football 
league in which she randomly selected 14 Christian teams to participate on the condition that 
they would be assigned four extra players each which may or may not be Muslim. She found that 
Christians randomly assigned to football teams with Muslim players were more likely to attend a 
mixed social event, even more likely to continue training with Muslims four months after the 
experiment had been initiated, and more likely to believe in the possibility of peaceful 
coexistence.  
Sport, recreation, and rebuilding shared public spaces were also proposed by youth 
themselves as measures to build peace and have fun together. Save the Children (2017:25) 
notes that ‘the following facilities were proposed by youth in interviews: football pitch, sports 
centre or gym, youth centre, swimming pool, park, bazaar, and craft workshop. An identical 
finding was made in a recent multisectoral needs assessment of Salah al-Din and Anbar 
governorates. Data from those governorates as well as Qayyarah subdistrict confirm that during 
ISIS occupation, residents lost access to social spaces such as parks, recreational centres and 
their related social activities, thus reducing opportunity for interaction and dialogue’.  
 
                                                   
9 Mousa, Salma, 2018, Overcoming the Trust Deficit: Intergroup Contact and Associational Life in post-ISIS Iraq. 
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